BRIEF TO US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
 
1. Your Excellency Assistant Secretary of State Ms Christina Rocca, Your
Excellency the Ambassador and members of the entourage,
 
2. As the Director General of Military Operations of Royal Nepalese Army, I
would like to take this opportunity to welcome you all once again at our Army
Headquarters. It's my privilege to give you a short brief on
 
Ø An overview of RNA
Ø Current Maoist situation in Nepal
Ø HMG and SF's Strategy
Ø Concept of Unified Command
Ø Civic, Peace and Development Mobilization
Ø Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
Ø Human Rights Situation and
Ø Potential Areas of US Govt Assistance.
 
Royal Nepalese Army
 
3. The current organization of Royal Nepalese Army comprises of three infantry
divisions, including nine infantry brigades with supporting arms and services
and one Valley Divisions, which looks after the security of the Kathmandu
Valley, The uniqueness of our organization is characterized by the presence of
independent rifle companies, directly under command of the infantry brigades,
which in turn, reflects the realities of terrain, tactics and command and
control procedures, Similarly, one infantry battalion might be deployed with
rifle companies spread over a large area, At present the total strength of the
Royal Nepalese Army is 72000. Presently the Nepal Police and Armed Police Forces
are operating jointly with Royal Nepalese Army to counter the Maoist insurgent
and terrorist activities.
 
 
Maoist Insurgency
 
4. Background, Communist movement has started in Nepal as early in 1954 AD.
Since then it has splited into various factions and also united During 1970-72
AD there was a violent uprising in the eastern part of Nepal by Communist Party
of Nepal (Marxist and Lennist) called Naxalbadi Movement which was suppressed.
In 1990-91 the Samyukta Janamorcha Party (United People's Front) a communist
group led by Babu Ram Bhattarai had contested election and gad won 9 scats in
Parliament in 1996 one of the dissatisfied group of this party with other
radical communist groups had submitted a 40 points demand to the government then
led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuva. As this group felt ignored by the
government, they announced their so called Peoples' War to overthrow the
existing political system. Since then the eight years of Maoist insurgency has
become an issued of serious concern to all Nepalese people. During the period of
this eight years more than 10000 people including security forces have been
killed. They have destroyed a number of development infrastructures and mostly
the rural work force of energetic youths have been fleeing the country. Due to
the security reasons most of the socio-economic development has also come to
stagnant.
 
 
5. The Maoist had come for the first peace talks in August 2001 but broke away
unilaterally on Nov 2001 and for the first time they attacked army garrisons, as
a result of which the government had to declare a state of emergency and
mobilized the army. After relentless military, political, and international
pressure, the Maoist again  declared a ceasefire on 29 January 2003 an came
forward for three rounds of peace talks after which once again they broke away
from it on 27th August 2003. Now they gave started their violent activities once 
again to include assassination of senior political security forces & other
government officials. It is considered that Maoist's recent unsuccessful attack
on two bases of Armed Police Force in Western Nepal resulting in heavy
casualties has caused them a serious set back. In order to reorganize and
strengthen their organization the Maoist Supremo Prachanda has recently issued a
press statement attempting to gain sympathy from public as well as from lower
ranks of security forces.
 
6. During the period of last cease-fire Maoist continued their activities of
extortion, kidnapping, murdering of  security personnel and civilian. Maoists
had extensively used that period to fulfil their following objectives:
 
a) Put forward their uncompromising demands.
b) Set conditions to release maximum numbers of their imprisoned cadres.
c) Interact with civil society, political parties and civil population at large
to exert influence. At the same time they persuaded leftist intellectuals to
advocate for constitutional assembly.
d) Collect as much war materials as possible, recruit and train maximum number
of guerillas to include child soldiers and expand their organization.
e) Organiae mass rallies, demonstration and mass procession by own party of
participate in rallies organized by other parties or groups.
f) Hold meetings with foreign diplomats to exert won propaganda in order to
erase their tarnished image and to prevent international meddling in the
internal matters of the nation.
g) Pressurize to stop external assistance extended especially by the UK and USA.
In this regard, recently they have stated that they will prevent US assisted
programs in Nepal to function.
h) Contact and influence high-ranking military and police personnel, so that
they can be useful in the future.
 
7. Maoists have been successful in al the above-mentioned goals except gaining
support from foreign diplomats, preventing  international support, and
influencing high ranking security forces personnel.
 
Maoist Current Activities
 
8.  Currently Maoist terrorist are conducting following activities:
 
a) Sabotage of government and civilian properties.
b) Assassination of security forces, political, & other high ranking officials
c) Urban terrorism (so-called urban guerilla warfare)
d) Carry out extortion
e) Attack soft targets (lightly held police posts, check points)
f) Ambushes (they say that would be carrying out 150 to 300 ambushes at a time
along terrain belt.)
g) Carry out so-called decentralized operations and strengthen for centralized
ops.
 
Maoist's Current Strategy
 
9. Establishment of bases in rural areas in order to encircle the  towns and
cities and finally encircle Kathmandu valley. For this they are carrying out
ambushes and other terrorist activities along the Terrain belt and strengthening
their organization.
 
10. The Maoist's likely game plan can be summarized as follows :
 
a) Form government or gain power through round table conference, interim
government and constitutional assembly, and run government for 5 years,
b) After 5 years, organize constitutional assembly and contest for elections.
c) During a period of ten years, organize and concentrate all dispersed cadres
of so-called Peoples Army and Maoist activists.
d) Once power is consolidated in both political and military fronts openly
challenge the security forces.
e) Simultaneously organize fronts for the democratic revolution
f) In the mean time some elements of so-called Peoples Army would continue to
remain in the jungle while the party consolidates itself.
 
11. As far the political scenario is concerned. There are five key players
involved in the process :
 
a) Firstly, HMG of Nepal wants to preserve multiparty democracy constitutional
monarchy, and an improved and stable law and order situation.
b) Whereas the Maoist want to continue the struggle with the support of other
parties pursue their strategy of negotiation/ struggle, and pursue for
constitutional assembly.
c) The main political parties are not willing to cooperate with the Maoist as
their existence and power may be at risk, they feel the government has forfeited
their rights, and they want the parliament to be reinstated. For this they have
been carrying our political agitation and as of lately have added further
demands.
d) The civil society at large wants peace and stability.
e) Finally the international community wants a peaceful resolution of the
conflict in accordance to the constitution and want to assist in peace building
in Nepal.
 
12. At present the government of Nepal, the civil society, and the international
community seem to be in the same grid.
 
13. I  Would like to present the following assessment :
 
a) Although Maoist have hinted that they do not oppose a constitutional
monarchy, the activities and the voice of their senior level leadership do not
point in that direction.
b) National and international pressure forced the Maoist for a safe landing, but
because of their unreasonable demand of constitutional assembly it could not
succeed.
c) The Maoist seemed in a position not to deviate from their demand of
constitutional assembly while the HMG is not in a position to grant the same.
d) Some amount of flexibility from the Maoist does not negate the fact that
their current strategy and organization will be a constant threat to the
democratic political system, constitutional monarchy, and the nation at large.
e) Once the Maoist political and military capability is completely degraded, and
then only Govt. should look into granting them a safe landing.
f) At present the only way to show government's credibility is providing
population oriented and effective governance as well as strengthening the
Security Force and their effective mobilization.
 
Your Excellency, now we would like to show few clips about Maoist activities.
 
14. HMG of Nepal is always destined to resolve the issue through political means
rather that the use of force. Which however would depend on the Maoist
themselves.
 
HMG's Strategy
 
15. In order to tackle the Maoist problem HMG of Nepal has formulated a strategy
that encompasses all elements of national power to include political, economic,
information and diplomatic activities. This strategy came in the form of Civil-
Military National Campaign Plan. The grand strategic objectives of the plan are
as follows :
 
a) Deter and defeat the Maoist military capability
b) Protect multiparty democracy & constitutional monarchy
c) Create a secure environment conducive  the conduct of local and general
elections.
d) Implement policies and measures for effective governance.
 
Strategy of CMNCP
 
(16) The strategies of civil-Military National campaign Plan are as follows:
 
Ø Conduct relentless operation against the Maoist to disarm them in order to
stop violence and terrorism.
Ø Negotiate with the Maoist only once their military capability is reduced
considerably or if they agree to abide by the present constitution.
Ø Enhance the credibility of the monarchy.
Ø Provide fair and effective governance.
Ø Continuously seek support and cooperation of the other political parties.
Ø Continuously seek faith and support of the citizens.
Ø Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration.
Ø Seek the support and cooperation of the international community, civil society
and media.
 
Concept of security:
 
16. The concept of security in the Civil-Military National Campaign are as
follows:
 
Ø Civil Military National Campaign Plan will remain the basis of our strategy to
counter the Maoist insurgency.
Ø Mobilize security forces in accordance with the Unified Command Concept.
Ø Relocate and reinforce security bases inline either the present strategically,
political, and geographical realities.
Ø Increase the strength of the security forces and equip them.
Ø Enhance the intelligence system.
Ø Establish Civic Peace& Development Mobilization committee under the
chairmanship of prime Minister.
 
CMNCP Desired End State :
 
18. The desired end state of CMNCP at Strategic Level is Long term peace and
security under multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy and at
Operational level is to defeat Maoist military capability.
 
Maoist desired End state:
 
19. The Maoist's Strategic End State is to establish a Republican stand and at
Operational level establishment of so-called people's Army.
 
Centre Gravity:
 
20. In the Campaign  Plan, the  centre of gravity of the HMG of Nepal as
ascertained as follows:
 
Ø Strategic Level – Popular Support
Ø Operational Level – Military capabilities.
 
21. In the campaign plan, the possible centre of gravity of the Maoist was
ascertained as follows:
 
Ø Strategic Level- Political and military command and control.
Ø Operational Level- Military capabilities.
 
22. The basic elements that were coordinated and harmonized in the campaign plan
to combat the Maoist insurgency are as follows:
 
Ø State political situation
Ø protection of own centre of Gravity.
Ø Strategic information campaign
Ø Economic and social development.
 
Security Forces Concept of Operations (2060)
 
23. Interest : To bring the Maoist to the political mainstream the RNA with
other security Forces will carryout offensive operations to deter & defeat
Maoist militarily capability. 3 key objectives will be achieved through this,
Ø Maintenance of peace and security.
Ø Destruction of Maoist military capabilities
Ø Force the Maoist to come under the umbrella of the present Constitution.
 
24. Method: The SF will continue to be mobilized throughout the nation to
exhibit government presence. protect its bases, & launch major  offensives
 
25. Measure of success : The Maoist military capability is defeated whereby that
commit themselves to the political mainstream & come to the negotiation table.
 
26. Security forces Operations : Security Forces will be carrying out following
operations :
Ø Offensive Ops (Ambushes. raid of hide outs/trg camps, cordon and search etc)
Ø Show of Force
Ø Border Ops
Ø Securing Lines of Communications and VAs/VPs
Ø Prevent Acts of Terrorism
Ø Humanitarian Assistance
Ø Hearts & Minds Campaign
Ø Information & Psychological Operations
Ø Population and Resources control.
Ø Contingency planning
 
Unified Command :
 
27. Concept of Unified Command is to
Ø Gain optimum use of capabilities and resources of various security Forces (SF)
Ø This is not to merge the identify of individual security Force
Ø It will be effective from the central level to the district level.
Ø It encompasses RNA,APF,CIVPOL & NID.
Ø RNA will have operational control other forces coming under unified command.
Ø With joint effort and single chain of command it will have the effect of force
multiplier.
 
Legal Provision :
 
28. Formulation of Unified command is not an all of sudden act. it was
considered 2-3 years before, Due to the current situation and requirement if has
become an integral part of HMG's Civil- Military National campaign plan,
 
Ø In September 2001- HMG had decided to mobilize CIVPOL under RNA control to
combat Maoist insurgency.
Ø In November 2002- HMG had decided to train 10000 VIVPOL to be trained by the
RNA & mobilized under its operational control.
Ø APF Act 2002- States that AFP will come under OPs Control of RNA when RNA is
mobilized.
Ø HMG has decided to mobilize RNA till Feb,2004 which may or may not be extended depends on the situation.
 
Strategy of Unified Command:
 
29. In accordance to CMNCP HMG has decide to form up the unified command with
four security agencies namely the RNA, CIV POL, APF and NID. The current time
plan of the unified command is for one year and it will be revised after every
six month. There will be a coordination mechanism at national, regional and
district level. For command and control at national level there is a Minister
delegated by HMG who acts on the directives issued by HMG. The COAS has overall
authority over security forces operations. At regional & District Administrator
(civilian govt official) and the Army Division commander mobilizes security
forces in respective area of operations. Div Cdr Army relocate, strengthen, and
withdraw troops from basses on the recommendation of Regional Administrator.
 
Civic Peace & Development Mobilization Committee:
 
30. In recent past there were instances where the local population of certain
areas had resisted the Maoist atrocities and drove them away, now they feel
insecure for any reprisals and requested the provision for security. Considering
the situation and importance of pacifying the Maoist from the population, the
government has decided to help those villages in terms of security and other
supports from the security force. For this the basic conditions identified are
as follows:
Ø Participation by all Political Parties & Civil Society
Ø Use of Retired security forces personnel.
Ø Mobilize locals to deter Maoist threats
Ø Coordinate development activities
Ø Morale, logistic & training support from security Forces.
 
31. For this there will be coordination bodies at central, Regional and District
level.
 
32. Organization As shown in the slide.
 
33. Planned Sequence of Action:
 
The planned sequence of action of this scheme is as follows:
 
Ø Phase 1- Preparation
Ø Phase 2- Execution
Ø Phase 3- Monitoring
Ø Phase 4- Conduct of local development.
 
34. Role of security forces : the role of security forces in civic peace &
Development Mobilization are as follows:
 
Ø Advisory role to the committee.
Ø Security training of local volunteer personnel.
Ø Reinforce local security team if required
Ø Sharing of information
Ø Planning of military civic action.
 
Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR)
 
35. Objectives: Obtain peacefully weapons from armed Maoist militant and
encourage them to live a peaceful life thereby nullifying Maoist's terrorist
activists.
 
36. Strategy of DDR:
 
Ø Provided monetary assistance to Maoist surrendering with weapons.
Ø Ensure physical security of the surrendered.
Ø Provision appropriate opportunities for economic security.
Ø Discard previous legal suits against such surrounding militants.
 
37. Targets of DDR Program:
 
Ø NCP (Maoist) guerillas and militias
Ø Active cadres of NCP (Maoist)
 
38. Desired End State of DDR:
 
Ø Disarming of armed militant so that peace and security prevails.
Ø Recovery of looted arms and ammunition of security forces.
 
39. DDR Program:
 
Ø Monetary assistance for weapons.
Ø Ensured physical security
 
o Local security base
o Rehabilitation center
o Community rehabilitation center.
o Economic security
 
40. Organization: As shown in the slide.
 
41. Resources : Essential resources required to implement the DDR programme are
planned to be fulfilled from following respective sources:
 
National
- Benefit for surrendered with weapons
- Expenses for local security base
- Running of rehabilitation center.
 
International /Foreign:
-Skill development training in rehabilitation centers
-Assistance for self-income generation schemes.
-Community rehabilitation.
-Publicity
 
Human Rights Situation:
 
42. After declaring the state of emergency in 23 November 2001 army was
mobilized to center the Maoist insurgency. Consequently the RNA had established
a cell responsible to monitor and investigate possible violations of human
rights by the security forces while operating against the Maoist.
At the AHQ it is organized under the Adjutant General and coordinated by the
Deputy Judge Advocate General. There are Human Rights cell in each Division HQ
also. These cells are responsible for training and dissemination of information
regarding human rights and also conduct investigation on any type of human
rights abuses by the security forces personnel.
 
43. In pacifying the Maoist problem our forces has always remained committed to
democratic practices & international humanitarian law. In this regard our forces
are especially instructed to use minimum force, avoid collateral damage, as well
as avoid at all costs human rights abuses. For this particular issue, at all
level of our command structure, we have established a mechanism to educate &
monitor human rights issues. Those found committing human rights abuses have
been reprimanded accordingly ( there are 13 instances of punish in security
forces personnel as per the provision of the law of the land who were found in
committing the human rights abuses). But let me assure you that there has been
no illegal detention, extra judicial killings, torture, or rape carried out by
the security Forces as alleged by the various human rights group. There may have
been some collateral damages which we always instruct our troops to minimize by
being judicious in the use of force, in isolated cases some of our troops have
committed mistakes for which they have been duly punished. We are still
finalizing our investigation of the killings at Doramba and the School in Doti.
Once the reports are finalized, we will make sure if anyone is found guilty,
they will be penalized accordingly, to make everything transparent, we have
allowed the ICRC to visit all of our camps to see the conditions of the delaines
and have always interacted with their representatives at all level.
 
44. The only irony is why the national and international human rights activities
make a big hue and cry if the security force commits a small mistake but remains
almost mum on the atrocities committed by the Maoist in the form of recruiting
school children, prevent schools from functioning, extorting money and security
personnel. Indiscriminate bombings, and there are lots of more. This has to be
carefully looked into. It is of grave concern to us that some of the
international community seems to be supporting the Maoist rather than the
government.
 
USG Assistance:
 
45. In regard to the US Gvt. assistance to HMG of Nepal and the RNA, it has been
of a great value for us, I on behalf of RNA would like to express our heartiest
gratitude to the government of the united states for providing us the political,
morale, and material support to counter the Maoist problem without which we may
not have reached this far, considering the current situation and also the future
we seek following assistance from the government of the US which will help us to
enhance the capabilities of the RNA.
 
Ø Weapons and equipments through the Foreign Military Financing to be expedited.
Ø Trainings for counter terrorism and insurgency to be continued.
 
Ø Means of aerial mobility:
Due to our rugged terrain and lack of infrastructure, our mobility has been
greatly hampered. Therefore we urgently require some transport helicopters,
which will greatly enhance our operational mobility.
 
Ø Surveillance equipment:
In order to target the command and control system of the Maoists, we have been
severely limited in terms of surveillance equipment and training. It this
support can be provided it will be possible to target their political leadership
in the very near future.
Ø Night vision equipments
Ø Technical and financial support for Rehabilitation, Reintegration,
Reconstruction and Reconciliation.
 
46. n closing the RNA believes that Maoist insurgency in Nepal can be solved by
political dialogue  rather than the use of force only. For this all elements of
national power are to be coordinated and of course the continuous support from
all friendly nationals in the forms of political, military, moral and also
material assistances are highly appreciated and we are grateful for that. I hope
the briefing we did was enough to highlight why the continued support from the
United States and the international community is crucial for the effort to bring
about peace and stability in Nepal.
 
We are sure one day we'll have peace again.
 
47. Your Excellency now should you have any query I would be happy to answer
them.